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a b s t r a c t
‘Theory of Mind’ refers to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and other people
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This study examined the extent to which ‘Self’ and ‘Other’
belief-attribution processes within the Theory of Mind (ToM) mechanism could be distin-
guished behaviourally, and whether these separable components differentially related to
Executive Functioning (EF) abilities. A computerized false-belief task, utilizing a
matched-design to allow direct comparison of self-oriented vs. other-oriented belief-attri-
bution, was used to assess ToM, and a face-image Stroop task was employed to assess EF,
within a population of typically-developed adults. Results revealed significantly longer
reaction times when attributing beliefs to other people as opposed to recognizing and
attributing beliefs to oneself. Intriguingly, results revealed that ‘perspective-shift’ require-
ments (i.e. changing from adoption of the ‘self’ perspective to the perspective of the ‘other’,
or vice versa) across false-belief trials influenced reaction times. Reaction times were sig-
nificantly longer when the perspective shift was from self-to-other than from other-to-self.
It is suggested that the ‘self’ forms the stem of understanding the ‘other’, and is therefore
processed regardless of ultimate task demands; in contrast, the ‘other’ perspective is only
processed when explicitly required. We conclude that adopting another person’s perspec-
tive, even when their belief state is matched to one’s own, requires more cognitive effort
than recalling and reflecting on self-oriented belief-states.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The ability to understand and attribute mental states,
including intentions, knowledge and desires, to both our-
selves and other people, is referred to as possession of a
‘Theory of Mind’ (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). These ‘mentalizing’ abilities
form an essential and fundamental role in many social
and communicative interactions, allowing successful and
mutual exchanges of information between individuals
(Hamilton, 2009; Ahmed & Miller, 2011). The mechanisms
underlying Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities are not as yet
clear. Recently, evidence has supported the notion of a
modular structure underlying ToM abilities, with separate
component parts involved in specific, differing mentalizing
processes (e.g. Bodden et al., 2010; Decety & Sommerville,
2003; Harari, Shamay-Tsoory, Ravid, & Levkovitz, 2010).
One such proposed delineation is between self-oriented
and other-person oriented mental state attribution, where
the ability to reflect on one’s own mental states (‘self’) may
utilize distinct mechanisms from those used in attributing
and understanding mental states of the ‘other’ (e.g. Decety
& Sommerville, 2003; Hartwright, Apperly, & Hansen,
2012; Jardri et al., 2011; Jeannerod & Anquetil, 2008).
The purpose of the present study was to determine
whether ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ belief-attribution processes, a
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.02.001
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part of the ToM mechanism, could be differentiated using
behavioural measures. Some prior research has examined
the ‘Self’/‘Other’ distinction within ToM, as will be dis-
cussed below. However, the present study is the first, to
our knowledge, to use a matched design in a false-belief
task, allowing creation of directly comparable conditions
of self/other belief-attribution processes. A secondary aim
of the current study was to assess the extent to which the-
se ToM components, if found to be separable, are driven by
differing aspects of Executive Functioning, as some prior
research has begun to indicate (e.g. Ahmed & Miller,
2011; Brent, Rios, Happé, & Charman, 2004; German &
Hehman, 2006). Executive Function (EF) refers to a set of
cognitive processes that regulate, control and manage
other cognitive processes, including inhibition, working
memory, cognitive flexibility, and planning (Miyake et al.,
2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Carlson & Moses, 2001).
Evidence has suggested a strong association between
ToM and EF abilities (e.g. Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers,
1991; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006; Ozonoff
& McEvoy, 1994), and Ahmed and Miller (2011) suggested
that by examining the relationship between ToM and EF,
researchers may be able to gain better insight and under-
standing of the mechanisms underlying ToM.
False-belief tasks are one of the tests most often used
to assess ToM abilities in both typically and atypically
developed individuals (Brewer, 1991). False-belief tasks
involve scenarios in which individuals are shown a situa-
tion where reality states differ from belief states, and
where a clear distinction between one’s own current belief
states and the current belief states of another individual is
created. One of the first false-belief tasks designed to
assess self and other belief-attribution abilities was
Perner, Leekham, and Wimmer’s (1987) ‘Smarties’ task. In
this task, children were shown a box of sweets (‘Smarties’)
and asked what they thought would be inside. On respond-
ing sweets/chocolate, children were shown that the box
actually contained pencils. The pencils were then re-hid-
den, and children were asked three critical questions, akin
to the following: ‘What did you think was in the box, before
you saw inside?’ (self-oriented belief attribution); ‘What
would your teacher, who hasn’t seen inside, think was in the
box?’ (other-oriented belief attribution); and ‘What was
really in the box?’ (reality test).
Converging evidence, from both the Smarties task and
other verbally explicit false-belief paradigms (e.g.
Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Gopnik & Astington, 1988;
Williams & Happé, 2010), suggests that a developmental
shift is undertaken by typically developing children at
the age of about 4 years; prior to this age, children tend
to fail ToM tasks, unable to inhibit their own current
knowledge states. From the age of 4-years, however, a
rapid improvement in ToM abilities is seen, with children
successfully able to recognize separate and differing men-
tal states of other people, acknowledging, for example, that
they themselves know that there are pencils in the box, but
another person, who hasn’t seen inside, would think it con-
tains chocolates (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Perner et al.,
1987; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Doherty, 2009).
The seemingly simultaneous emergence of these capacities
may indicate a single ‘ToM’ mechanism, with no detectable
differentiation in the development of self vs. other-orient-
ed belief-attribution abilities.
However, cases in which ToM abilities fail to fully
develop or are disrupted due to illness or injury provide
evidence for the occurrence of deficits that may differen-
tially affect self and other ToM. For instance, a particular
focus of past research has been Autistic Spectrum Condi-
tions (ASC), a defining feature of which is difficulties with
ToM abilities (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, &
Plumb, 2001; Brent et al., 2004; Frith, 1989; Hillier &
Allinson, 2002; Lombardo et al., 2010). Individuals diag-
nosed with ASC are often found to display egocentric beha-
viours in ToM tasks akin to those seen in typically
developing children prior to the age of 4-years. Results
about the type of ToM deficits experienced by individuals
with ASC have been mixed, with suggestions of specific
deficits in attributing mental states to other people (e.g.
Hutchins, Prelock, & Bonazinga, 2011; Wimmer & Perner,
1983), problems with reflecting on one’s own mental
states (e.g. Williams & Happé, 2010), or deficits in both
self-oriented and other-person oriented belief-attribution
(e.g. Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Brent et al., 2004;
Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekham, 1989). Most commonly,
however, individuals with ASC are suggested to show a
particular deficit in their social cognition abilities,
specifically reduced in their capacity to comprehend and
understand differing mental states of other people, which
supports the notion of differentiation between the ‘self’
and ‘other’ in ToM processes (Baron-Cohen, Tager-
Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, 2007).
Additional evidence for the distinction between ‘self’
and ‘other’ has been offered by Samson, Apperly,
Kathirgamanathan, and Humphreys (2005), who present
a case study of an adult patient (WBA) with a right fron-
to-temporal brain lesion. Patient WBAwas found to exhibit
a specific problem with inhibiting the ‘self-perspective’,
whilst retaining the ability to infer someone else’s perspec-
tive. The patient could understand that other people’s
knowledge may vary from his own, and could successfully
attribute mental states to them, but only if his own person-
al knowledge did not contradict the other person’s, or was
not too salient. For instance, if patient WBA knew the true
location of an object in a false-belief task, he was unable to
inhibit an egocentric pre-potent response; however, if he
did not know the true location of the object, although he
knew that the object had been moved and the naïve other
was therefore in possession of a false-belief, he was able to
successfully attribute a belief to the other person. In this
way, Samson et al. (2005) argued that there is a distinction
between processing of the ‘self’ perspective and processing
of the ‘other’ perspective.
To further explore the extent of this differentiation,
some prior literature has focused on the extent to which
‘self’ and ‘other’ perspectives are processed automatically,
with results suggesting that the very presence of a sec-
ondary agent (the ‘other’) can influence the behaviour of
an individual (e.g. Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, &
Andrews, 2010; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010). Samson
et al. (2010), for instance, reported a study in which par-
ticipants were slower to report the number of dots visible
in a room when a secondary agent could not see all the
22 E.E.F. Bradford et al. / Cognition 138 (2015) 21–34
dots; they suggest this implies that individuals auto-
matically take note of the fact that others may have differ-
ent knowledge states given their different point of view,
even when this information is irrelevant to the task at
hand. Kovács et al. (2010) reported a study in which both
adults’ and 7-month-old infants’ behaviours (reaction
times and looking times, respectively) appeared to be
influenced by an automatic encoding of another agent’s
beliefs, even when the beliefs of the agent were irrelevant
to the actual task.
Qureshi, Apperly, and Samson (2010) suggest a distinc-
tion between awareness of differing knowledge states and
explicit adoption of another person’s perspective; simply
knowing that someone’s mental states differ from one’s
own is not necessarily the same as being explicitly aware
of what the other person’s mental state is (see also:
Schneider, Slaughter, & Dux, 2014). Supporting this disso-
ciation between ‘awareness’ and ‘adoption’ of another per-
son’s mental states, Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Samson, and
Chiavarino (2006) conducted a study in which participants
were either instructed to track an individual’s beliefs, or
were not instructed to do so but were given unexpected
questions about the other person’s beliefs. Participants
watched a video of an object being placed in a box. An
actor then left the scene, and the object was moved to a
different location, creating a false-belief state for the actor.
In one condition of this task, participants were instructed
to keep track of where the object was located (reality
state). In a second condition, participants were instructed
to track where the object really was and, importantly,
where the actor thought the object was (belief-attribu-
tion). Results revealed that when instructed to track the
actor’s belief states, there was no difference in time taken
for participants to identify either the true location of the
object, or to identify where the actor believed the object
to be. In contrast, in the condition in which they were sim-
ply told to track the location of the object (and not the
belief state of the actor), participants took significantly
longer to identify where the actor believed the object
was compared to identifying where the object was actually
located. Contradicting Samson et al. (2010) and Kovács
et al. (2010), these results suggest that other-oriented
belief-tracking is not an automatic process, and may only
be undertaken when explicitly required. Back and
Apperly (2010) further support these findings, suggesting
that others’ beliefs are not automatically inferred, but
rather require explicit motivation to track this information.
As discussed above, previous studies have suggested
that a differentiation between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ is present
when considering and attributing mental states, and there
remains some debate as to the extent to which the ‘other’
perspective is automatically processed. However, an issue
with these studies is that the ‘self’ and ‘other’ conditions
are often difficult to compare directly, because different
task requirements are used for self/other conditions. For
instance, in Samson et al.’s (2010) study, response times
where compared between conditions in which a secondary
agent’s view was either matched to the participant’s (i.e.
they could both see the same number of dots on a wall)
or mis-matched (i.e. the participant could see a different
number of dots to the agent). Similarly in Apperly et al.’s
(2006) study, the comparative conditions refer to other-
oriented belief states and reality states, which may argu-
ably be resolved from recall of a memory, rather than
requiring an explicit judgement of one’s own belief states.
The current study sought to address these problems by
developing a false-belief task in which belief-states were
created from either the other-perspective or the self-per-
spective, and remained matched in structure and forma-
tion (i.e. the same sentence set-up and task requirements
were introduced, whether ultimately the final question
was self or other oriented). In this way self and other
belief-attribution processes could be explicitly and directly
compared under the same task requirements.
Much documented evidence points to a strong asso-
ciation between ToM abilities and Executive Functioning
(EF) capacities (e.g. Ozonoff et al., 1991; Ozonoff &
McEvoy, 1994; Sabbagh et al., 2006). In typically developed
adults, it has been demonstrated that a heavier cognitive
load can influence success on ToM tasks, often resulting
in more egocentric errors, supporting the notion of a rela-
tionship between ToM and EF (e.g. Bull, Philips, & Conway,
2008; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004). Keysar,
Barr, Balin, and Brauner (2000) report a study in which two
adults (a participant and a confederate, the ‘director’) sat
on opposite sides of a table, with a vertical grid between
them. Some of the slots on the grid were occluded so that
only the participant, but not the director, could see them,
creating distinct self and other-person perspectives. The
task required participants to follow the director’s instruc-
tions in reassigning positions to various objects. Some
objects were unique (e.g. a truck) and others were ambigu-
ous, such as three candles (small, medium, large). In the
case of the candles, the smallest candle, from the par-
ticipant’s view, may have been occluded so that, if the
director said ‘move the small candle’, he would be referring
to the medium sized candle, which is the smallest from his
perspective. Using eye-tracking equipment, Keysar et al.
(2000) found that participants were sometimes biased by
an egocentric interpretation of instructions – even when
they clearly knew that information was shared or privi-
leged, they still focused on the occluded objects as poten-
tial solutions. These findings have been replicated across
different studies, suggesting a resilient effect of egocentric
biases in adults in implicit tests of ToM (e.g. Apperly et al.,
2010; Surtees, Butterfill, & Apperly, 2012). These results
indicate that even in typically developed adults, who argu-
ably should possess the cognitive mechanisms necessary
for successful ToM expression, EF abilities (e.g. inhibition,
attention direction) may not automatically be recruited
when ToM is assessed implicitly, and may only be utilized
when explicitly required.
Some contradictory evidence about the relationship
between ToM and EF has also been reported. Fine,
Lumsden, and Blair (2001) report a case study of patient
B.M., who suffered from amygdala damage and had been
diagnosed with schizophrenia and Asperger’s syndrome.
Patient B.M. was shown to be severely impaired in his abil-
ity to represent mental states (ToM) but did not show any
impairment in his EF abilities (Fine et al., 2001). However,
in the majority of cases, studies continue to find a link
between EF and ToM abilities, both within clinical
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populations (e.g. Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Ozonoff &
McEvoy, 1994), and in non-clinical populations (e.g.
Carlson et al., 2002; Hughes, 1998). Further, the EF-ToM
relationship has been demonstrated across both Western
and non-Western societies, such as Sabbagh et al.’s
(2006) study showing a relationship between ToM and EF
in pre-schoolers from both the United States and China.
Whilst a link between EF abilities and ToM expression
abilities has been mostly supported, the specifics of this
relationship are as yet unclear. For instance, if it is indeed
the case that ToM is constructed of separable component
parts, it is possible that some specific aspects of ToM will
be more demanding of EF than others. Further, different
aspects of EF may be more important than others in the
expression of ToM capacities (e.g. Bull et al., 2008;
German & Hehman, 2006). For instance, Carlson et al.
(2002) suggest that inhibition and working memory have
the strongest relationship with general ToM abilities (i.e.
inhibitory control as opposed to planning abilities). These
results were supported by German and Hehman (2006)
who found that increasing executive demands resulted in
decreased performance on ToM tasks in both younger
and older adults, and that inhibition abilities and process-
ing speed were key in determining ToM task performance.
They suggest that deficits in ToM may be the result of a
deficit in EF abilities, rather than necessarily a deficit in
the ToM mechanism specifically. McKinnon and
Moscovitch (2007) also assessed performance of older
and younger adults on ToM tasks and EF tasks. Results
revealed that for all adults, ToM performance varied with
the demands placed on EF abilities, with decreased ToM
performance co-occurring with increased EF demands
(e.g. working memory).
A potential differentiation that has been suggested
within EF is that of affective versus non-affective EF (e.g.
Reeck & Egner, 2011). Reeck and Egner (2011) found that
affective distracters in a Stroop task influenced par-
ticipant’s performance, regardless of whether the aim of
the task was to identify an emotion (task-relevant) or the
gender (task-irrelevant) of a presented face. In contrast,
non-affective distracters only influenced performance
when the task was relevant (i.e. identify gender) and not
when the task was irrelevant to the distracter (i.e. identify
emotion). Given this asymmetry between affective and
non-affective stimuli, it is argued that they may activate
separable EF abilities; affective tasks may tap into more
mentalizing abilities due to the need to attribute an emo-
tional state to a static face, than non-affective tasks, where
observation of traits may be enough to attribute a specified
gender, without requiring anymental state attribution. The
emotional tasks could therefore arguably require entirely
separate processing from non-emotional tasks, or addition-
al processing to meet task demands, potentially resulting
in mobilisation of extra EF resources. This distinction pro-
vides an opportunity to explore whether these two compo-
nents differentially relate to ToM abilities, further allowing
investigation of whether these two EF abilities are indeed
separable, or whether they are simply reflecting two
aspects of one overarching EF capacity.
The current study sought to explore the extent to
which self-oriented and other-oriented ToM could be
differentiated using behavioural measures (reaction times
and error rates) in a non-clinical, typically developed adult
population, and the extent to which these ToM components
differentially relate to EF abilities. Studying this relationship
in adults will allow insights about the importance of EF in
the activation and maintenance of ToM abilities in adult-
hood, when both of these abilities are arguably fully devel-
oped (Ahmed & Miller, 2011; Anderson, Levein, & Jacobs,
2002; Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2009). To assess
self/other differentiations, a novel task based on the stan-
dard false-belief paradigm was used, in which participants
completed a computerized version of a false-belief task, fol-
lowedbyprobe questions about either their ownbelief state
or that of another person. The novelty of this task is that, as
far as the authors are aware, this is the first task inwhich self
and other belief-attribution questions are explicitly
matched in design to allow direct comparison between the
two conditions. Further, the study adopts a novel approach
in distinguishing the requirement for participants to explic-
itly reflect on their own prior beliefs, rather than potentially
utilizing recall of priormemory, without necessarily requir-
ing belief-attribution. A face/word image Stroop task was
also employed, with affective and non-affective conditions,
to investigate the extent to which different ToM
components (self and other) may relate to separable EF
abilities.
If, as Kovács et al. (2010) suggest, the perspectives and
beliefs of other people are automatically processed along-
side the self-perspective, regardless of ultimate task
demands, we would not expect there to be any significant
difference in response times between self or other-orient-
ed belief attribution trials in our Self/Other Differentiation
Task, as, in both cases, the response should already be
known to participants. However, if the ‘other’ is only pro-
cessed when the task explicitly requires it (e.g. Apperly
et al., 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010), longer response times
would be expected in the ‘other’ perspective conditions
than in the ‘self’ perspective conditions, as the ‘other’
would not have been considered until required. Within
the Self/Other Differentiation task, participants are asked
to solve problems from either their own or another per-
son’s perspective. In some trials, participants are asked to
switch perspectives, where they would begin a trial by
answering a dilemma from one perspective (e.g. ‘Where
would John look for some bread?’ – other-oriented) and
end a trial by answering a probe question from another
perspective (e.g. ‘What did you think was in the box?’ –
self-oriented).
Of interest in this study is the effect of the presence or
absence of a perspective shift within a trial, and whether
being required to shift between self- and other-oriented
perspectives within a single trial influences response
times. If it is the case that the ‘other’ is always processed,
no significant difference in reaction times should be found
between self-to-other and other-to-self trials in perspec-
tive shift conditions, as both self and other perspectives
should have already been considered, regardless of task
requirements. If, however, only the ‘self’ is automatically
processed, unless task demands explicitly require the
‘other’ to be considered, then reaction times should be fas-
ter in the other-to-self perspective shift trials than in the
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self-to-other perspective shift trials; in the former, the
‘self’ will have already been processed, to allow under-
standing of the ‘other’ perspective, whereas in the latter,
consideration of the perspective of the other has not yet
been required.
Prior research has suggested that affective and non-af-
fective Stroop tasks may tap into different abilities, pri-
marily due to the finding that affectively salient stimuli
are prioritized above non-affective stimuli in cognitive
processing, capturing attention and disrupting task perfor-
mance at a higher rate (Reeck & Egner, 2011). In the cur-
rent study, correlation analysis will be conducted to
explore the relationship between performance on the
Self/Other Differentiation task and affective and non-affec-
tive versions of the Stroop task (EF abilities), to assess
whether these two components differentially relate to
ToM abilities. It is predicted that higher levels of cognitive
control, as indicated by affective and non-affective Stroop
scores, will positively correlate with mentalizing perfor-
mance (i.e. belief attribution assessed using response times
at the probe stage of the Self/Other Differentiation Task).
That is, better performance on the Stroop task (i.e. higher
levels of inhibition abilities) would correlate with better
performance on the ToM task (i.e. ability to switch
between Self/Other perspectives when attributing beliefs).
Further, affective Stroop task scores may more strongly
correlate with ToM task performance than non-affective
Stroop tasks, as they may tap into more ‘mentalizing’ abil-
ities (identifying emotion expressions) than the non-affec-
tive task (gender identification).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Sixty-two adult participants (50 females; mean age
22.8 years, range 18–55) were recruited from St Andrews
University, Scotland. All participants were required to be
either native or fluent in English, and were reimbursed at
a rate of £5 per hour. All participants gave informed con-
sent and this study was approved for use in human sub-
jects in accordance with the University of St Andrews
Research Ethics committee.
2.2. Procedure
Participants were tested in a single session, lasting
between 60 and 90 min. Participants completed the Self/
Other Differentiation Task and the Stroop task as part of
a larger task battery, which will not be presented in this
paper. All tasks were separated by a break in the session.
The order of tasks was randomized across participants.
After completion of testing, participants received a written
and verbal debriefing of the study’s aims.
2.3. Measures
2.3.1. Self/Other Differentiation Task
This computerized task was programmed using E-
Prime. The task consisted of 12 practice trials and 60 test
trials, each consisting of three stages: dilemma stage, con-
tents revelation stage, and probe stage. Fig. 1 provides a
pictorial depiction of each of these stages and a timeline
illustrating presentation order. The practice and test trials
both followed the same format, but only the test trials
required belief attribution. Participants were asked to
respond as quickly and accurately as possible, both before
the practice trials began and again before the test trials
commenced. A fixation cross (+) was shown for 1000 ms
between each trial. Fig. 2 illustrates each of the different
test conditions in the Self/Other Differentiation Task.
Dilemma Stage – used to identify a belief-state, in the
dilemma stage participants were asked to select a contain-
er from three images presented in a horizontal line, in
which they would look for a specific object (e.g. ‘Ruth has
been saving up some money at home. Where would she look
for it?’ with the options of a plastic container, piggy bank,
or cat carrier presented below). Dilemmas could be either
self-oriented (‘Where would you look?’; 30 trials) or other-
oriented (‘Where would John look?’; 30 trials). In practice
trials, participants were simply asked to select a specific
object (e.g. ‘Select the yellow bag.’). The questions were
shown for 1500 ms before the image options were dis-
played. Image answer options were displayed for a maxi-
mum of 5000 ms. If participants did not select the correct
container or failed to make a selection in this time, an ‘X’
was displayed for 1000 ms, before resetting the dilemma
until the correct choice was made.
Contents Revelation Stage – having selected the correct
container at the dilemma stage, contents of the container
was then revealed. Contents could either be expected
(e.g. coins in the piggy-bank) or unexpected (e.g. earrings
in the piggy-bank). Contents were shown for 2000 ms. Fol-
lowing self/other-oriented dilemmas, half of each were fol-
lowed by expected contents, the other half by unexpected
contents. In practice trials, contents was always expected
(e.g. a wallet in a bag).
Probe Stage – the critical probe stage was used to assess
belief-attribution abilities. Participants were asked to iden-
tify what either they themselves (self-oriented) or another
person (other-oriented) believed was in the container,
before they saw inside. The probe questions were matched
in terms of syntax and syllables, so that each sentence had
at least one paired match in the opposite condition (Self vs.
Other). For self-oriented questions, the probe could, for
example, be either: ‘Before you saw what was inside, what
did you think was in the container?’ or ‘What would you think
was in the container if you hadn’t seen inside?’. For other-ori-
ented questions, the probe could be, for example: ‘Before
John saw what was inside, what did he think was in the con-
tainer?’ or ‘What would someone who hasn’t seen inside think
was in the container?’. There were an equal number of ques-
tion forms across each trial type (see Table 1 for details of
trial types and the number of trials in each condition). All
names used in ‘Other’ conditions were one syllable, ensur-
ing the lengths of sentences were not altered.
Answers were again given by selection of one image
from three presented in a horizontal line. Distracter ques-
tions were also included at the probe stage (e.g. ‘What col-
our was the egg box?’), to try and reduce participant’s
anticipation of the correct answer until they saw the probe
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question. Two reality test questions were included within
the distracter questions (i.e. ‘What was actually in the con-
tainer?’), one following expected contents and one follow-
ing unexpected contents, to ensure participants
understood the task. The probe question was displayed
for 1500 ms before the three answer options were
revealed. Image answer options were displayed for a max-
imum of 8000 ms. If an incorrect response (including no
response) was recorded, the task continued on to the next
trial without resetting. In practice trials, participants were
asked to select the picture that showed what had been in
the bag (i.e. reality/true belief).
Stimuli were presented on a 17 inch CRT monitor. The
keyboard was used to record responses, with participants
pressing the key that corresponded with the spatial loca-
tion of the correct image. Keys used were 1, 2, and 3 from
the number pad on the right side of the keyboard; if the
correct answer was on the left, the correct response would
be ‘1’, the centre ‘2’ and the right ‘3’. Coloured images, from
the Bank of Standardized Stimuli (Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie,
Montreuil, & Lepage, 2010) and the Amsterdam Library of
Object Images (Geusebroek, Burghouts, & Smeulders,
2005), were presented on a white background, in the cen-
tre of the screen. Questions were presented in black text,
using ‘calibri’ font. Reaction time was recorded at both
dilemma and probe stages, from the moment that the three
images of potential answers were presented.
2.3.2. Stroop Task
Stimuli consisted of black and white face images from
Ekman and Friesen (1976), with word labels placed direct-
ly beneath the image. The stimulus set consisted of four
female and four male individuals’ faces, each with both
happy and sad expressions, resulting in a total of 16 dis-
tinct face stimuli. Images were standardized and cropped
to an oval shape consisting only of the main facial features,
removing non-face information, such as hair, which could
have facilitated performance during gender discrimination.
Each of the 16 face images was paired with four different
word labels (gender – ‘male’, ‘female’, and emotion – ‘hap-
py’, ‘sad’) that were placed directly beneath the images
(black ink, upper case lettering), resulting in 64 face-word
stimuli sets. Fig. 3 provides examples of the types of stim-
uli employed. Stimulus presentation and data collection
used E-Prime software.
There were two task types within this experiment: gen-
der-identification task and emotion-expression identifica-
tion task. All participants took part in both tasks, with
task order counter-balanced between participants. On each
trial, participants were presented with a face-word
Fig. 1. Illustration of the different stages of a single trial in the Self/Other Differentiation Task: the Dilemma Stage (‘Self’ or ‘Other’), Contents Revelation
Stage (Expected or Unexpected), and Probe Question Stage (‘Self’, ‘Other’, or Distracter).
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stimulus and instructed to make a judgement of the face,
as quickly and accurately as possible, whilst ignoring the
word label. In the gender trials, participants were asked
to make a gender judgement (is the face male or female?),
and in the emotion trials, participants were asked to make
an expression judgment (is the face happy or sad?).
Responses were made via keyboard presses using the index
fingers from the right and left hands on keys ‘Z’ and ‘M’.
Stimuli were presented until a response was recorded, or
for a maximum of 2000 ms if no response was made.
Between trials, a fixation cross (+) was presented for
1000 ms, in the centre of the screen.
The distracter labels shown underneath the face
image stimuli could be either semantically congruent or
incongruent with the target face image. For instance, a
happy male face could be accompanied by a congruent
‘male’/‘happy’ label, or by an incongruent ‘female’/‘sad’
label. The distracter could also be either task-relevant
or task-irrelevant (i.e. gender words in the emotion-iden-
tification task, emotion words in the gender-identifica-
tion task). Participants completed four blocks of 64
trials within each task type; within these, two blocks
included task-relevant distracters, and two blocks includ-
ed task-irrelevant distracters. Within both task-relevant
and task-irrelevant blocks, half of the trials used congru-
ent stimuli, the other half incongruent stimuli, with
stimuli presented in a randomized order. Therefore, there
were a total of 256 test trials in each of the gender and
emotion identification tasks. At the beginning of each
task type (i.e. emotion/gender identification), participants
completed a short practice session (8 trials). Order of
block presentation (i.e. task relevant/task irrelevant)
within the gender/emotion tasks was randomized across
participants.
Fig. 2. Examples of each of the different test conditions in the Self/Other Differentiation task. Letters indicate different stages of individual trials: (a)
Dilemma Question (Self/Other) – used to establish a belief state, before image answer options (b) were shown. (c) Contents Revelation – creating either a
false-belief (unexpected contents) or a true-belief (expected contents) scenario. (d) Probe Question (Self/Other), after which image answer options (e) were
added. Distracter trials were also included at the Probe stage, but only critical test trials (Self/Other) are shown in Fig. 2.
Table 1
Number of trials in each condition combination in the Self/Other Differentiation Task. Reality test questions are indicated in parenthesis.
Self dilemma Other dilemma
Self probe Other probe Distracter Self probe Other probe Distracter
Expected contents 4 4 6 (1) 4 4 7 30
Unexpected contents 4 4 7 4 4 6 (1) 30
Total 8 8 14 8 8 14 60
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3. Results
Participants were screened for outliers in overall reac-
tion times. That is, we checked for individual participants’
mean response times that were outside three standard
deviations from the overall reaction time mean. No outliers
were found, so all 62 participants were retained for
analysis.
3.1. Self/Other Differentiation Task
3.1.1. Response time data
Only correct responses were considered for response
time (RT) analyses. RT data were separately analysed for
Dilemma and Probe stages. That is, if an error was commit-
ted at the Dilemma stage, the RT to the dilemma was
excluded from analysis of dilemma RTs. However, follow-
ing this error, if the answer was correct at probe stage,
the Probe stage RT was included in analysis, as these were
regarded as two separate time points.1 All correct responses
given within the set response window were included in
analysis.
3.1.1.1. Dilemma Stage. A t-test revealed a significant differ-
ence in RT to dilemma questions as a function of dilemma
type, t(61) = 5.99, p < .001, r = .15, with faster responses
to self-oriented dilemmas (M = 1582 ms) than to other-ori-
ented dilemmas (M = 1763 ms).
3.1.1.2. Probe Stage. For analysis of RT to the probe ques-
tion, the relationship between Dilemma Type and Probe
Type was taken into account, resulting in a factor of
‘Perspective Shift’. For trials in which there was no per-
spective shift, both the Dilemma and Probe addressed
either the self (Self-Self) or the other (Other-Other). For
trials in which there was a perspective shift between
Dilemma and Probe stages, the shift could be from either
the ‘self’ at dilemma stage to the ‘other’ at probe stage
(Self-Other), or from the other at the dilemma stage to
the self at the probe stage (Other-Self).
RTs to probe questions were analysed using a 2 (Per-
spective Shift: No Shift vs. Shift)  2 (Contents Type:
Expected vs. Unexpected)  2 (Probe Type: Self vs. Other)
Repeated-Measures ANOVA.
There was a significant main effect of Probe Type, F(1,
61) = 17.78, p < .001, partial g2 = .23, with faster responses
to self-oriented probes (M = 932 ms) than other-oriented
probes (M = 1093 ms). This effect was modulated by Per-
spective Shift, resulting in a significant interaction
between Perspective Shift and Probe Type, F(1, 61) = 5.27,
p = .03, partial g2 = .08. This interaction was due to larger
Probe Type effects (Other minus Self) in perspective shift
trials (M = 244 ms) than in no-perspective shift trials
(M = 78 ms). In other words, within perspective-shift con-
ditions, it was harder to shift from Self-to-Other
(M = 1139 ms) than from Other-to-Self (M = 895 ms),
t(61) = 4.04, p < .001. In no-perspective shift conditions,
there was no significant difference between Self-to-Self tri-
als (M = 969 ms) and Other-to-Other trials (M = 1047 ms),
t(61) = 1.78, p = .16. Fig. 4 illustrates the different RTs
(and error rates) in response to the probe question in each
condition of the Self/Other Differentiation task.
This perspective-shift effect tended to be further
modulated by contents type (expected vs. unexpected),
resulting in a trend towards a three-way interaction
between Perspective Shift, Contents Type, and Probe Type,
F(1, 61) = 2.94, p = .09, partial g2 = .05. Post-hoc analysis
suggested that the interaction between perspective shift
and probe type was only present for expected contents tri-
als, F(1, 61) = 6.75, p = .02, partial g2 = .10, but not for unex-
pected contents trials, F(1, 61) = .46, p = .50. No other
effects reached significant levels (all p’s > .05).
Fig. 3. Examples of experimental stimuli for the emotion identification task and the gender identification task. For simplicity, only one face-image (female,
happy) is shown here, in each of the task conditions.
1 Additional analysis was conducted on probe stage RTs in which trials
where an error was made at the dilemma stage (and answered correctly at
probe stage) were excluded from analysis. Results demonstrated the same
pattern of findings: a significant main effect of Probe Type, F(1, 61) = 18.18,
p < .001, partial g2 = .23, and a significant interaction between Perspective
Shift and Probe Type, F(1, 61) = 4.90, p = .03, partial g2 = .07. Additionally, a
significant interaction between Perspective Shift and Contents Type was
found, F(1, 61) = 4.78, p = .03, partial g2 = .07.
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3.1.2. Error rate data
3.1.2.1. Dilemma Stage. Analysis of error rates in response
to the dilemma question revealed no significant difference
between Self-Oriented Dilemmas (M = 2.92% errors) and
Other-Oriented Dilemmas (M = 2.37% errors), t(61) = 1.14,
p = .26.
3.1.2.2. Probe Stage. Analysis of error rates in response to
the probe question revealed a significant main effect of
contents type, F(1, 61) = 18.08, p < .001, partial g2 = .23,
with less errors in expected contents trials (M = 1.61%
errors) than in unexpected contents trials (M = 5.45%
errors). There was a significant three-way interaction
between Perspective-Shift, Contents, and Probe Type, F(1,
61) = 6.76, p = .01, partial g2 = .10. Post-hoc analysis sug-
gested that this was because an interaction between Per-
spective-Shifting and Probe-Type was only present in
unexpected contents conditions, F(1, 61) = 5.41, p = .02,
partial g2 = .08, but not for expected contents conditions,
F(1, 61) = 1.15, p = .29. No other effects were significant
(all p’s > .05).
3.2. Stroop task
Only correct responses given within the set response
window were included in RT analysis.
3.2.1. Response time data
A 2 (Task Type: Emotion vs. Gender)  2 (Task Rele-
vance of Distracter: Relevant vs. Irrelevant)  2 (Distracter
Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) Repeated-Mea-
sures ANOVA was conducted on RT data.
Analyses of RT data revealed a main effect of task type,
F(1, 61) = 26.85, p < .001, partial g2 = .31, with slower
responses in emotion-identification tasks (M = 594 ms)
than in gender-identification tasks (M = 547 ms). A main
effect of distracter congruency was also found, F(1,
61) = 45.55, p < .001, partial g2 = .43, with faster responses
in congruent trials (M = 565 ms) than incongruent trials
(M = 576 ms).
There was no significant main effect of distracter rele-
vance, F(1,61) = 2.68, p = .11. However, distracter relevance
interacted with distracter congruence, F(1,61) = 8.03,
p = .006, partial g2 = .12, as the Stroop effect (incongruent
minus congruent) was present only for task-relevant dis-
tracters (M = 17 ms), t(61) = 6.63, p < .001, but not for
task-irrelevant distracters (M = 5 ms), t(61) = 2.07,
p = .22. There was a significant interaction between Task
Type and Distracter Congruence, F(1,61) = 4.14, p = .046,
partial g2 = .06, due to the presence of a larger Stroop effect
in the emotion-identification task (M = 23 ms) than in the
gender-identification task (M = 12 ms). No other interac-
tions were significant. Fig. 5 illustrates these findings.
3.2.2. Error rate data
Analyses of error rates revealed a significant main effect
of Task Type, F(1, 61) = 13.18, p = .001, partial g2 = .18, with
less errors in the gender-identification task (M = 4.37%
errors) than in the emotion-identification task (M = 5.78%
errors). There was also a significant main effect of Dis-
tracter Congruence, F(1, 61) = 11.36, p = .001, partial
g
2 = .16, with less errors following congruent distracters
(M = 4.62% errors) than incongruent distracters
(M = 5.53% errors).
There was a significant interaction between Distracter
Relevance and Distracter Congruence, F(1, 61) = 14.07,
p < .001, partial g2 = .19. Post-hoc analysis showed that this
was because only task relevant distracter trials showed a
significant difference in error rates between congruent
(M = 4.01% errors) and incongruent (M = 5.73% errors) tri-
als, t(61) = 4.56, p < .001. There was no significant differ-
ence in error rates between congruent (M = 5.23% errors)
and incongruent (M = 5.33% errors) trials in task irrelevant
distracter trials, t(61) = .325, p = .74. No other effects
were significant (all p’s > .05; see Fig. 5).
3.3. Correlations: Self/Other Differentiation Task and Stroop
task measures
For the purposes of correlational analysis, an Affective
(Emotion-identification) Stroop score and a Non-Affective
(Gender-Identification) Stroop score were calculated for
each participant, from task relevant distracter conditions.
This score was created by subtracting congruent trials RT
from incongruent trials RTs.
Three scores were calculated for correlations in the Self/
Other Differentiation Task, based on RT to both the
Fig. 4. The upper graph presents mean response time (in ms), and the
lower graph presents accuracy data (percentage of errors) to the probe
question in each test condition of the Self/Other Differentiation task. Error
bars represent standard error of the mean.
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dilemma stage and the critical probe stage (i.e. belief
attribution):
(1) Dilemma Score – the difference in RT between
dilemma types: (Other minus Self).
(2) Probe Score – the difference in RT between probe
types: (Other minus Self).
(3) Perspective-Shift score – the difference in RT
between trials in which a perspective-shift was
required and trials in which no perspective-shift
was required:
ðSelf-Other Other-SelfÞ  ðOther-Other Self-SelfÞ
There was no significant relationship between the emo-
tion-identification/gender-identification Stroop scores
and either dilemma difference scores (p’s > .05) or probe
difference scores (p’s > .05).
There was a significant positive relationship between
perspective-shift scores and performance on the emo-
tion-identification Stroop task, r = .27, p = .03 (2-tailed).
There was no significant correlation between perspec-
tive-shift scores and performance on the gender-identifica-
tion Stroop task, r = .17, p = .20 (2-tailed). This suggests
that smaller perspective-shift scores (i.e. smaller difference
in RT between perspective-shift types) were correlated
with smaller affective Stroop scores; that is, higher levels
of cognitive control in the affective Stroop trials correlated
with faster ‘perspective-switching’ in the Self/Other Differ-
entiation Task. Fig. 6 provides a scatterplot illustrating the
significant correlation between perspective-shift scores
and the affective Stroop task scores.
4. Discussion
In this study, trials were manipulated so that mental
state attribution was required in regards to either one’s
own previously held beliefs, or to another person’s current-
ly held beliefs. In this context, ‘mental state attribution’
refers to the concept of holding two potentially contrasting
belief states in one’s own mind (i.e. possession, or aware-
ness, of a false-belief state). When the contents of a con-
tainer were revealed to be unexpected (e.g. marbles in a
sugar jar), participants would be in possession of a true
belief – knowledge that inside the jar are marbles – whilst
also being aware that someone else, who hasn’t seen inside
the jar, would hold a false-belief that there is sugar inside.
The results of this study support the idea of a measurable
dissociation between self and other-person belief attribu-
tion processes at a behavioural level in a healthy adult
population. More specifically, results showed that RTs
were significantly longer when questions (probes) referred
to other-people compared to when they referred to the
self. In trials which did not require a perspective-shift
between dilemma and probe stage, there was no
Fig. 5. Mean response times (top graphs) and error rates (lower graphs) by distracter relevance and congruence, presented separately for the emotion-
identification task and the gender-identification task. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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significant difference in response times between self or
other probe conditions. This suggests that once the ‘self’
or ‘other’ perspective had been adopted at the dilemma
stage, it was then maintained from this perspective
throughout the trial, allowing quick ‘other’ or ‘self’ per-
spective assessments to be made by simply using the belief
states computed at the dilemma stage.
Most interestingly, however, the requirement of a per-
spective-shift within a trial – and, further, the type of per-
spective-shift required – significantly affected response
times. When participants were required to shift from their
‘Self’ perspective at dilemma stages to thinking of the
‘Other’ perspective at probe stages, reaction times were
significantly longer than when the shift was from thinking
of the ‘Other’ to thinking of the ‘Self’. This finding suggests
that in ToM, the self-perspective is always processed first,
regardless of whether the ultimate goal is to refer to the
self or to the other. More specifically, when one first pro-
cesses a task from another person’s perspective, before
having to switch to the ‘self’ later, behavioural responses
are as efficient as when the self perspective was processed
from the beginning. This suggests that the Self-perspective
has already been spontaneously ‘processed’ at the dilemma
stage, even if the task itself required adoption of the ‘Other’
perspective. Therefore, the Self perspective was already
available when required at the probe stage in the shift from
Other-to-Self within a trial. In contrast, when a task began
from the first person perspective at the dilemma stage
(self-oriented), switching to the Other-person perspective
at the probe stage, RTs were significantly slower and more
error prone, suggesting that the ‘Other’ perspective had not
yet been processed; the additional cognitive processing
necessary to compute the perspective of the ‘other’ was
only engaged in when explicitly prompted, at the probe
stage.
These results imply both a significant overlap between
cognitive mechanisms responsible for self and other-per-
son belief attribution, and some distinct mechanisms
involved in either self or other-person belief attribution
(Jeannerod & Anquetil, 2008). More specifically, we pro-
pose that the ‘self’ perspective is always processed, regard-
less of the ultimate task demands (i.e. whether it is to
orientate to self or other perspectives), whilst the ‘other’
perspective is only processed when explicitly required by
the task. These results contradict Kovács et al.’s (2010) sug-
gestion that the ‘other’ view is processed automatically,
but support Apperly et al.’s (2006) proposal that other’s
beliefs are not tracked automatically, and are only consid-
ered when motivation to track another person’s beliefs,
whether directly or indirectly, is present; that is, our
results support a distinction between ‘awareness’ of differ-
ing knowledge states and explicit adoption of another per-
son’s perspective (e.g. Schneider et al., 2014).
In our study, participants were explicitly asked to con-
sider another agent’s belief state which, ultimately, was
matched to the participant’s own belief state (i.e. what
they believed to be in a container), and thus were required
to adopt the perspective of the ‘other’, as opposed to sim-
ply being aware of the presence of a differing perspective
or state. This differs from studies such as Samson et al.
(2010) and Kovács et al. (2010), in which the presence of
a secondary agent, irrelevant to the actual task, appeared
to influence behaviours. In those prior studies, the ‘other’
view both differed from the ‘self’ view (e.g. the dots seen
by the participant and avatar in Samson et al.’s task) and
was not directly relevant to the task. Therefore, par-
ticipants simply needed to demonstrate awareness of the
presence of a differing state, which may have slowed
response times, but does not necessarily reflect actual
adoption and understanding of what the other person’s
mental state may be. The current task, in contrast, required
both awareness of the existence of a different mental state
and adoption of another agent’s mental state.
One possible explanation for the longer response times
in the other-oriented conditions may be a simple ‘surprise’
response resulting from the sudden appearance of the
‘other’, which is absent in the self-oriented conditions.
However, it could be argued that this delay in response
times does not merely reflect ‘surprise’, but is indicative
of the additional cognitive effort required for the explicit
differentiation between ‘self’ and ‘other’. As previously
stated, in this task there was no difference in answers to
probes between the self and other perspective trials – both
the knowledgeable self and naïve ‘other’ share the belief of
what was in a specific container before seeing inside (e.g.
sugar in a sugar jar), whether the contents was ultimately
expected or unexpected. For instance, a participant may
have been asked where they would look for some cookies,
identifying a biscuit jar. They may then have been shown
that there were either cookies (true belief) or elastic bands
(false belief) inside. In both cases, before seeing inside,
both the self and other-person believe there to be cookies
in the jar, regardless of whether they then become more
knowledgeable about the true contents (self) or not
(other). Therefore, the key differentiation between self
and other oriented trials was the perspective participants
were prompted to respond from at probe stage – the
answer being the same in both conditions (e.g. believing
there to be sugar in the sugar jar), but from either the self
or other perspective. It is further noted that trials in which
Fig. 6. Scatterplot showing correlations between perspective-shift scores
from the Self/Other Differentiation task and the Emotion-Identification
Stroop Task.
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a perspective shift occurred from Other-to-Self across a
dilemma to probe were significantly faster, and more accu-
rate, than Self-to-Other trials, suggesting it is not the pres-
ence and surprising nature of a perspective shift itself that
elongates responses and increases errors, but rather the
cognitive effort associated with the specific shift from the
self-perspective to the other-perspective.
A perhaps intriguing result of this study was that con-
tents – expected vs. unexpected – did not significantly
influence response times, despite being a key feature of
false belief tasks. However, analysis of error rates revealed
that more errors were made by participants following the
unexpected contents revelation (i.e. false-belief scenarios)
compared to the expected contents conditions (true-belief
scenarios). The belief-attribution task used in this study
was designed for typically developed, healthy adults to
complete and was not intended to be difficult; that is, each
of the questions was easily answerable, and relatively sim-
ple to compute. Results suggest that, whilst the contents
manipulation worked in creating false-belief scenarios,
with participants making more mistakes when holding
two contrasting beliefs at one time as demonstrated by
the error rates (i.e. true-knowledge and false-belief about
the contents of a container), once a solution had been
reached (i.e. awareness and knowledge of true/false
beliefs), behaviour was not significantly affected by the
type of belief involved, but rather by the type of perspec-
tive shift required (self vs. other oriented).
The present study also adapted a face-word Stroop
paradigm to explore the effect of affective vs. non-affective
EF abilities, and how these may differentially relate to ToM
capacities. Utilizing a within-subjects design, we found
that participants were slower identifying emotions than
gender in faces, supporting prior findings that affective
stimuli are differentially processed compared to non-affec-
tive stimuli (e.g. LeDoux, 2000; Ohman & Mineka, 2001).
We also found that the Stroop effect (longer response time
for incongruent trials), for both the emotion expression
(affective) and gender-identification (non-affective) tasks
occurred only when distracters were task-relevant. This
supports prior findings that suggest that distracters only
influence task performance when relevant to the task at
hand, as, otherwise, they do not create any cognitive con-
flict that needs to be resolved, provoking a significant dif-
ference in response times between congruent and
incongruent trials (Reeck & Egner, 2011).
Correlational analysis suggested that there was a posi-
tive relationship between affective Stroop task scores and
the ‘perspective-shifting’ abilities required for the Self/
Other Differentiation Task, whilst non-affective Stroop task
scores were not significantly correlated with perspective
shifting performance. This supports the notion that there
might be separate forms of EF that may be independently
related to ToM expression. The positive correlation found
between Affective Stroop scores and perspective-shifting
suggests that participants who were faster at shifting
between self and other perspectives were also better at
ignoring irrelevant emotional distracters. This, however,
was not due to a generalized superior EF skill to ignore dis-
tracters, because the non-affective Stroop scores did not
significantly correlate with perspective shift performance.
The affective Stroop task may be tapping into a specific
aspect of EF that is relevant for mentalizing abilities
(Hartwright et al., 2012). However, a note of caution must
be added: whilst failing to reach significance, the non-af-
fective Stroop task showed a correlation value with per-
spective-shifting abilities in the same direction as the
affective-Stroop task, and we cannot rule out the possi-
bility that with more power some significant correlation
could be found. Additionally, examination of Fig. 6 reveals
that there were some extreme values within our correla-
tion analysis; although the results of all participants
included were screened prior to analysis, exclusion of the
most extreme score from the correlation (see far right in
Fig. 6) would result in the disappearance of the significant
correlation between affective Stroop scores and perspec-
tive-shifting capacities, which suggests that the relation
between affective Stroop EF and perspective shifting abil-
ities might have been driven by a few particular indi-
viduals. Further study is required to more firmly
establish the extent to which these two EF abilities both
diverge and overlap and how this may vary in the
population.
Overall, our results support findings from recent neuro-
imaging studies using fMRI (Rothmayr et al., 2011; Van der
Meer, Groenewold, Nolen, Pijnenborg, & Aleman, 2011)
and PET (Happé et al., 1996) techniques, which have found
differences in cognitive activation when task requirements
(perspective shift/state type) are varied; that is, different
forms of ToM (such as Self/Other or Affective/Cognitive)
activate different neural mechanisms, seemingly drawing
on separable, although likely interconnected, processes to
successfully utilize ToM capacities. Our results support this
notion that different types of mental state attribution
recruit both common and distinct cognitive mechanisms,
reinforcing the idea that there is not a single overarching
‘mentalising mechanism’ that accounts for all ToM pro-
cessing, but rather a system of different processes activat-
ed depending on task demands (such as Self vs. Other ToM
or Affective vs. Cognitive ToM). Our findings suggest that
the ability to understand the self-perspective forms a pre-
requisite for understanding other people’s perspectives.
The ‘self’ perspective would be always processed, regard-
less of task demands, whilst the ‘other’ perspective would
be processed only when explicitly necessary. The cognitive
mechanisms associated with self-oriented belief process-
ing are also activated when the task demands an other-
person orientation, although additional and specific
‘other-oriented’ mechanisms are also recruited (Decety &
Sommerville, 2003); in other words, self-understanding
forms a core component of ToM belief-attribution abilities
(Hobson, 2010; Happé et al., 1996; Frith & Frith, 2003).
As noted previously, Samson et al. (2010) report contra-
dictory findings, suggesting that individuals automatically
keep track of other people’s knowledge states, even when
not specifically required to do so (see also Keysar et al.,
2000; Kovács et al., 2010). However, Qureshi et al. (2010)
suggest that whilst we may automatically keep track of
the knowledge states of others, it requires cognitive effort
to deliberately take their perspective. This explicit adoption
of the other’s perspective is what our study demanded and
what might require a previous computation of the Self
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perspective. Through the use of a matched design, allowing
direct comparison of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ oriented processing,
our results also support the findings of Apperly et al.
(2006) and Back and Apperly (2010), adding strength to
the suggestion that other-oriented belief-attribution is
not an automatic process.
5. Conclusion
This paper explored the extent to which Self-Oriented
and Other-Oriented belief attribution abilities – two poten-
tially separable components of the ToM mechanism –
could be differentiated behaviourally in a healthy, adult
population. Results revealed that when asked to consider
another person’s belief-state (e.g. ‘What did Jane think
was in the box?’), participants took much longer to answer
than when they were asked to reflect on their own prior
belief state (e.g. ‘What did you think was in the box?’). This
suggests that, even when initial beliefs states are matched
(e.g. both the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ believed there to be sug-
ar in a sugar bowl, before seeing inside), it takes longer to
assess what the ‘other’ would believe to be in the container
compared to what oneself believed to be in the container.
Particularly interesting, the results of the current study
also showed a specific effect of shifting perspectives
(Self-to-Other/Other-to-Self) across a trial. Shifting from
one’s own perspective (‘Where would you look?’) to the per-
spective of another person (‘What would Jane think?’) is
more difficult, taking significantly longer and resulting in
more mistakes, than shifting from another person’s per-
spective (‘Where would Jane look?’) back to one’s own per-
spective (‘What did you think?’). These findings suggest that
the ‘Self’ perspective is always processed, regardless of
whether ultimate task demands require a participant to
orient to the ‘Self’ or ‘Other’ perspective, allowing the ‘Self’
perspective to simply be recalled in Other-to-Self trials. In
contrast, the ‘Other’ perspective is only processed when
explicitly necessary, thus requiring extra time to evaluate
and attribute this belief-state in Self-to-Other trials.
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